Some thoughts on the compatibility of the GloBE UTPR with EU primary law and tax treaties
Di Paolo Arginelli
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Abstract (*)
GloBE Rules on Global Minimum Taxation and Pillar Two have designed a new paradigm of taxation for large multinational (and national) groups. The effectiveness of the Pillar Two system relies on the interaction between three main taxing rules: QDMTT, IIR and UTPR. The UTPR, in particular, which works as a backstop to the other two rules, makes it difficult for multinational groups to escape from the application of the minimum taxation and incentivizes countries around the globe to introduce provisions patterned along the lines of the GloBE Rules in their domestic tax systems. However, the UTPR presents serious issues of compatibility with the international obligations assumed by those countries in the tax field. In this respect, the present contribution briefly describes the goal and functioning of the UTPR and then analyses its possible conflicts with EU primary law and OECD Model-based tax treaties.
Alcune riflessioni sulla compatibilità dell’UTPR GloBE con il diritto primario e i trattati fiscali dell’UE – Le regole GloBE sulla tassazione minima globale e il c.d. Secondo Pilastro (Pillar Two) del Progetto BEPS hanno delineato un nuovo paradigma impositivo per i grandi gruppi multinazionali (e nazionali). L’efficacia del sistema del Secondo Pilastro si basa sull’interazione tra tre principali regole impositive: QDMTT, IIR e UTPR. L’UTPR, in particolare, che funge da norma di chiusura del sistema, rende più complesso per i gruppi multinazionali sottrarsi all’applicazione della tassazione minima globale e crea un incentivo per i paesi di tutto il mondo a introdurre nei propri ordinamenti tributari disposizioni conformi alle regole GloBE. Tuttavia, l’UTPR presenta rilevanti profili di incompatibilità con gli obblighi internazionali assunti da questi paesi in ambito tributario. In detta prospettiva, il presente contributo descrive brevemente l’obiettivo e il meccanismo di funzionamento dell’UTPR, per poi analizzare i profili di possibile conflitto tra tale regola e il diritto primario dell’Unione europea, da un lato, e le convenzioni bilaterali per evitare le doppie imposizioni conformi al Modello OCSE, dall’altro.
Summary: 1. Reasons and scope of the contribution. – 2. Overview of the role and functioning of the UTPR within the GloBE Rules system. – 3. Compatibility of the UTPR with the EU primary law. – 4. Compatibility of the UTPR with tax treaty provisions, in general …– 5. … and with particular regard to the treaty obligations of EU Member States. – 6. Conclusions.
1. GloBE Rules on Global Minimum Taxation and Pillar Two (https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/global-minimum-tax/global-anti-base-erosion-model-rules-pillar-two.html) have designed a new paradigm of taxation for large multinational (and national) groups. The effectiveness of the Pillar Two system relies on the interaction between three main taxing rules: QDMTT (Qualified Domestic Minimum) Top-up Tax, IIR (Income Inclusion Rule) and UTPR (Undertaxed Profit Rule). The UTPR, in particular, which works as a backstop to the other two rules, makes it difficult for multinational groups to escape from the application of the minimum taxation and incentivizes countries around the globe to introduce provisions patterned along the lines of the GloBE Rules in their domestic tax systems.
However, the UTPR presents certain issues of compatibility with the international obligations assumed by those countries in the tax field. In this respect, in the past doubts were raised in respect the conformity of the UTPR with EU primary law, particularly fundamental freedoms (both the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital) and state aid rules. In addition, one may wonder whether the UTPR encroaches the limitations to tax profits and other items of income imposed on contracting States by tax treaties patterned along the lines of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
Dissecting those issues is the purpose of the present contribution. To this end, the author shall first describe the goal and functioning of the UTPR within the framework of the GloBE Rules and the Pillar Two Directive (Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523 of 14 December 2022 on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational enterprise groups and large-scale domestic groups in the Union – hereinafter also “Directive”). He shall then analyse the possible conflicts of the UTPR with EU fundamental freedoms and state aid rules. Right after, special attention shall be dedicated to the compatibility of the UTPR with OECD Model-base tax treaties from both a general perspective and the vantage point of EU Member States. Some brief remarks shall conclude.
2. As previously mentioned, within the system of the GloBE Rules devised by the Pillar Two and the Inclusive Framework on BEPS (OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two): Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1787/782bac33-en), the UTPR is designed to operate as a backstop to the IIR (and the QDMTT). In this perspective, its main purpose is twofold: on the one hand, pressing jurisdictions to adopt the GloBE rules (in particular QDMTT and IIR) in order to avoid other countries eating what would be their piece of the tax cake under such GloBE rules; and, on the other hand, encouraging multinational groups to structure their holdings in a way that brings their operations within the scope of application of the QDMTT or IIR of some jurisdiction (OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Administrative Guidance on the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two), OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD Publishing, Paris, July 2023, www.oecd.org/tax/beps/administrative-guidance-global-anti-base-erosion-rules-pillartwo.pdf, 89).
To achieve those goals, the UTPR provides a mechanism for collecting the Top-up Tax (i.e. the levy necessary to ensure the minimum level of taxation agreed upon within the Inclusive Framework, equal to 15%) relating to a low-taxed entity of the in-scope group (hereinafter “LTCE”) to the extent that such Top-up Tax is not brought within the charge of a qualified IIR. To put it differently, the Top-up Tax due in respect of any LTCE (which is already net of any applicable QDMTT), if not subject to a sufficient qualified IIR (i.e. qualified IIR for a percentage equal to the Ultimate Parent Entity – UPE’s Ownership Interests in such LTCE), is collected through the application of the UTPR for the amount of such Top-up Tax that is not already subject to qualified IIRs. Under the UTPR, such an amount is attributed to all jurisdictions where the group operates through its constituent entities and which have implemented a qualified UTPR on the basis of allocation keys reflecting the relative substance of the group in those jurisdictions.
The mechanics of the UTPR are set out by three Articles of the Model Rules devised by the Inclusive Framework: (i) Article 2.4 provides the details of the UTPR mechanism that must be applied by all UTPR Jurisdictions (i.e., the jurisdictions that have implemented a qualified UTPR under their domestic law and for which such qualified UTPR is in force with regard to the relevant Fiscal Year); (ii) Article 2.5 establishes the Total Amount of the MNE’s Top-up Tax that must be collected under the UTPR (the UTPR Top-up Tax Amount); and (iii) Article 2.6 lays down the allocation rules to split the UTPR Top-up Tax Amount among the UTPR Jurisdictions.
For each Fiscal Year, the Model Rules impose on each UTPR Jurisdiction an obligation to apply to its relevant Constituent Entities an additional cash tax expense equal to the UTPR Top-up Tax Amount allocated to that Jurisdiction. Article 2.4.1 leaves room for UTPR Jurisdictions to choose the best means to achieve that result in compliance with their domestic law. Indeed, although the suggested solution is to deny deductions from the corporate tax base, the Article explicitly recognizes that any ‘equivalent adjustment’ would also represent a solution compliant with UTPR Model Rules. As the Commentary puts it, the «UTPR does not prescribe the mechanism by which the adjustment must be made [which] is a matter of domestic law implementation that is left to the UTPR Jurisdictions» (OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy – Consolidated Commentary to the Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (2023): Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/b849f926-en – hereinafter “Commentary” – 43, para. 46). For example, the Commentary refers to both additional taxes and additional amounts of deemed income. What appears of utmost importance, in this respect, is that whatever form the UTPR adjustment takes under the legislation of the relevant UTPR Jurisdiction, the latter should carefully devise the UTPR rule so as to limit the possible conflicts with domestic constitutional principles and international tax obligations, in particular tax treaty obligations, a matter on which we will be back later.
The Model Rules do not prescribe how any relevant Jurisdiction should allocate the UTPR Top-up Tax Amount among the Constituent Entities that are situated therein, nor which Constituent Entity should pay the additional cash tax expense. That is a matter left to the domestic law of each UTPR Jurisdiction (Commentary, 55, para. 51). The Commentary mentions several elements that an UTPR Jurisdiction could take into account for the purpose of allocating the UTPR Top-up Tax Amount among its Constituent Entities, such as whether there are Constituent Entities belonging to the same tax consolidated group (ibid.), or whether they are wholly owned (or almost wholly owned) by the MNE Group, rather than partially-owned Constituent Entities (Commentary, 44, para. 52).
Article 2.5 deals with the computation of the Total UTPR Top-up Tax Amount for a Fiscal Year, which is then allocated to the various UTPR Jurisdictions in accordance with the rules put forward in Article 2.6 and collected by such Jurisdictions as provided for in Article 2.4.
In this respect, the general rule is set for in Article 2.5.1, which provides that the Total UTPR Top-up Tax Amount for a Fiscal Year is the sum of the Top-up Taxes calculated for each LTCE (thus, net of any applicable QDMTT) of the group under Article 5.2.4. In order to take into account that the Top-up Tax could be already collected, wholly or partially, through the application of the IIR, Articles 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 provide for certain exceptions to the above-mentioned general rule.
In particular, Article 2.5.2 stipulates that for the purpose of Article 2.5.1, an LTCE’s Top-up Tax shall be deemed equal to zero in a Fiscal Year if all the UPE’s Ownership Interests in that LTCE are held directly or indirectly by one or more Parent Entities that are required to apply a qualified IIR in respect to that LTCE in such Fiscal Year. Similarly, Article 2.5.3 provides that, where the conditions for the application of Article 2.5.2 are not met but a part of the LTCE’s Top-up Tax is nonetheless collected through the application of qualified IIRs, for the purpose of Article 2.5.1 the LTCE’s Top-up Tax shall be reduced by the part thereof that is brought into charge under such Qualified IIRs. Indeed, there may be situations where the UPE does not apply the IIR, but one or more Intermediate Parent Entities own an interest in an LTCE and apply the IIR in respect of their share of the LTCE’s income (which is overall lower than the share of that income directly and indirectly attributable to the UPE). This provision ensures that the part of the LTCE’s Top-up Tax that is already brought into charge by way of application of qualified IIRs shall not be collected twice, since only the remainder is effectively subject to UTPR.
However, since Article 2.5.3 reduces the Total UTPR Top-up Tax Amount by the amount of the Top-up Tax brought into charge by means of the IIR, it leads to the taxation also of GloBE Income that is beneficially owned by minority shareholders. In this respect, unlike the IIR, the UTPR – where charged – does not limit the taxation of the GloBE income to the share thereof that is allocable to the UPE. To put it differently, Article 2.5.3 does not limit the collection of an LTCE’s Top-up Tax to the part thereof that would have been allocated to the UPE if the UPE had been subject to a Qualified IIR. This outcome is certainly not coherent with the object and purpose of the UTPR within the GloBE system (i.e. as a backstop to the IIR), as it makes the result achieved by way of application of the UTPR potentially inconsistent with the result that would have been realized if the IIR had been applied at the UPE level (Li J., The Pillar 2 Undertaxed Payments Rule Departs From International Consensus and Tax Treaties, in Tax Notes International, vol. 105(12), 2022, 1698; De Broe L. – Debelva F., Pillar 2: An Analysis of the IIR and UTPR from an International Customary Law and European Union Law Perspective, in Intertax, vol. 50(12), 2022, 902 DOI: https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2022098; De Broe L., Some EU and Tax Treaty Law Considerations on the Draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals in the Union, in Intertax, vol. 50(12), 2022, 884; Noked N., Designing Domestic Minimum Taxes in Response to the Global Minimum Tax, in Intertax, vol. 50(10), 2022, 683 (footnote 53); Trabucchi A. – Grilli S., Interazioni tra la normativa CFC e il Pillar 2 – Parte I, in Rivista della Guardia di Finanza, 2022, 6, 1375).
The only reasons that may be put forward to justify this incoherence are (i) simplification (Commentary, 49, para. 78), as the mechanism devised in Articles 2.5.1 and 2.5.3 is certainly easy to apply, and (ii) effectiveness, as the risk of being subject to a harsher taxation than the one that would derive from the application of the IIR by the UPE could push MNE groups to (re)structure their holdings in a way that brings their operations within the scope of application of the IIR in the UPE Jurisdiction. However, the solution adopted, although simple and effective, does not appear proportionate to its end, as a more coherent system to compute the UTPR (such as that equating the UTPR Top-up Tax computed for each LTCE to the IIR Top-up Tax computed for the same LTCE) could – and would – have been equally simple and probably not less effective in tackling groups low taxation.
As previously mentioned, Article 2.6 provides for the rules to allocate the Total UTPR Top-up Tax Amount among the different UTPR Jurisdictions. More specifically, Article 2.6.1 stipulates the general rule of allocation, according to which the Total UTPR Top-up Tax Amount shall be divided among all UTPR Jurisdictions according to a formula based on the number of employees and the accounting value of tangible assets of the Constituent Entities of those Jurisdictions. As highlighted by the Commentary, relying on substance factors such as the number of employees and the book value of tangible assets provides for a simple and transparent allocation key which facilitates the coordination among tax administrations (Commentary, 49, para. 81). In addition, since those factors are based on information required in the MNE Group’s CbCR, they provide both groups and tax administrations with bright-line measures based on existing compliance mechanisms and facilitate co-ordination among UTPR Jurisdictions, thus minimizing the risk of disputes (Commentary, 49, para 82) and compliance costs (Commentary, 50, para 85).
Transparency, simplicity and certainty, however, although important elements of the tax policy underlying Pillar Two (OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Report on Pillar Two Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020, 3, 14, https://doi.org/10.1787/abb4c3d1-en), are not the only reasons for choosing the number of employees and the book value of tangible assets as criteria to allocate the Total UTPR Top-up Tax Amount among UTPR Jurisdictions. Indeed, UTPR Jurisdictions where there are relatively more employees and a higher book value of tangible assets are expected to be the UTPR Jurisdictions with the higher capacity to absorb the UTPR Top-up Tax Amount, for instance, through the denial of deduction of personnel costs and depreciation. In this regard, the Commentary highlights that the allocation mechanism under Article 2.6.1 is intended to reduce the risk of allocating Top-up Tax to jurisdictions that do not have enough capacity to effectively impose the UTPR adjustment (Commentary, 49, para. 81).
The general rule provided for by Article 2.6.1 is derogated by Article 2.6.3, which establishes that the UTPR Percentage of a UTPR Jurisdiction is deemed to be zero for a Fiscal Year as long as the UTPR Top-Up Tax Amount allocated to that Jurisdiction in a previous Fiscal Year has not resulted in the Constituent Entities located therein having an additional cash tax expense equal, in total, to the UTPR Top-up Tax Amount allocated to that Jurisdiction for such previous Fiscal Year. The purpose of Article 2.6.3 is to strengthen the effectiveness of the UTPR as a backstop to the IIR, by ensuring that (i) no additional UTPR Top-up Tax is allocated to a Jurisdiction until it has been able to effectively collect the requisite amount of UTPR Top-up Tax allocated thereto – with reference to a specific group – in previous Fiscal Years and, at the same time, that (ii) the Total UTPR Top-Up Tax Amount of that MNE Group is allocated to other UTPR Jurisdictions (see also Commentary, 51, para. 92).
3. In order to assess the compatibility of GloBE Rules (and UTPR in particular) with EU primary law, we rely on the working hypothesis that all EU Member States’ GloBE legislations are compliant with the Pillar Two Directive. In this respect, it is worth noting that, if the Directive had not been adopted, there would have been a concrete risk that the domestic laws of EU Member States implementing the GloBE Rules could have led to multiple violations of the EU Fundamental Freedoms and, possibly, also of EU State Aid Rules (see, among others, Englisch J. – Becker J., International Effective Minimum Taxation: The GloBE Proposal, in World Tax Journal, 2019, 483 et seq.; Schmidt P.K., A General Income Inclusion Rule as a Tool for Improving the International Tax Regime, in Intertax, vol. 48, 2020, 983 et seq.; Pinto Nogueira J.F., GloBE and EU Law: Assessing the Compatibility of the OECD’s Pillar II Initiative on a Minimum Effective Tax Rate with EU Law and Implementing It within the Internal Market, in World Tax Journal, 2020, 465 et seq.; Englisch J. – Becker J., Implementing an International Effective Minimum Tax in the EU, Working Paper Reihe der AK Wien – Materialien zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 224, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik). However, this is no longer the case after the adoption of the Pillar Two Directive.
First, the Directive is a comprehensive piece of EU secondary legislation that does not leave much room to Member States for the purpose of its transposition. This would entail that, under our working hypothesis, any violation of EU primary law – including EU Fundamental Freedoms – would generally be tested at the level of the Directive, rather than at the level of the implementing legislations of EU Member States. From this vantage point, it is relevant to recall that EU secondary legislation benefits from a presumption of legality and, coherently, the Court of Justice generally recognizes a broad margin of discretion to the Council when adopting directives, also in view of the difficult political and economic balancing of the opposing interests at stake that the Council has to perform. The result is that the Court only exceptionally concludes that a Council’s directive violates primary EU law, and it does so particularly in the case of palpable and disproportionate infringements (see, accordingly, Szudoczky R., The Relationship Between Primary, Secondary and National Law, in HJI Panayi C. et al. (eds.), Research Handbook on European Taxation Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, 93 et seq.).
Second, the Directive has integrated the GloBE Rules with two relevant additions, which together avoid both the application of the UTPR in intra-EU situations and, more generally, the violations of Fundamental Freedoms and State Aid Rules. On the one hand, Articles 5(2), 6(2), 7(2) and 8(2) of the Directive have extended the application of the IIR to all low-taxed domestic entities established in the EU Member State of the UPE (including the UPE Itself), as well of other Parent Entities. The combination of this rule and the IIR entails that the UTPR never applies in intra-EU situations (see, concurrent, Dietrich M. – Golden C., Consistency Versus ‘Gold Plating’: The EU Approach to Implementing the OECD Pillar Two, in Bull. Int’l Tax’n, 2022, 183 et seq.; De Broe L., Some EU and Tax Treaty Law Considerations on the Draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals in the Union, cit., 874 et seq.). On the other hand, Article 1(1) of the Directive extends the application of the GloBE Rules to large-scale domestic groups, as defined by Article 3(5) thereof.
The result is that the Directive removes the risk of possible conflicts with primary EU law. With respect to the infringement of State Aid Rules, this conclusion builds on the fact that any selective advantage stemming from GloBE national rules would be imputable to EU secondary legislation, rather than to the domestic law of the Member States. Moreover, with specific regard to fundamental freedoms, the two above-mentioned additions exclude any (direct and indirect) discriminatory treatment of intra-EU cross-border situations as compared to purely domestic situations.
One could wonder whether a possible infringement of the free movement of capital would remain in the case of an application by EU Member States of the UTPR with respect to third countries’ LTCEs controlled by third countries’ UPEs. This author opines that this is not generally the case based on a two-fold argument. First, it is apparent that the personal scope of the GloBE Rules is limited to (multinational) groups. In particular, the GloBE Rules apply only in respect of the profits of Constituent Entities (i.e., controlled or owned entities, consolidated under the relevant financial accounting standards) and Joint Ventures. In this respect, a Joint Venture is defined by Article 36(1)(a) of the Directive as ‘an entity whose financial results are reported under the equity method in the consolidated financial statements of the ultimate parent entity, provided that the ultimate parent entity holds, directly or indirectly, at least 50% of its ownership interest’. Under IAS/IFRS (IFRS 10) the ownership and control criterion always enable the parent company of the MNE Group to exert a definite influence on the controlled company’s decisions and to determine its activities. Similarly, under IAS 28 a Joint Venture is defined as a joint arrangement whereby the parties that have joint control of the arrangement have rights to the net assets of the arrangement. In both cases, it appears that the UPE may exercise a definite influence on the Constituent Entities and Joint Venture under the well-known Baars standard (CJEU, 13 April 2000, Case C-251/98, Baars, para. 22), as the Court of Justice of the EU does not require a majority shareholding for a definite influence to exist (CJEU, 21 January 2010, Case C-311/08, SGI, paras 34-35).
As a consequence, the situations covered by the Directive should be regarded as falling within the scope of application of the Freedom of Establishment, and not of the Free Movement of Capital (Pinto Nogueira J.F., GloBE and EU Law: Assessing the Compatibility of the OECD’s Pillar II Initiative on a Minimum Effective Tax Rate With EU Law and Implementing It Within the Internal Market, cit., 2020, 465 et seq.; Englisch J. – Becker J., Implementing an International Effective Minimum Tax in the EU, cit.; De Broe L. – Massant M., Are the OECD/G20 Pillar Two GloBE-Rules Compliant with the Fundamental Freedoms?, in EC Tax Review, 2021, 86 et seq.). As the Freedom of Establishment does not extend to third countries, since it requires that both the parent and the subsidiary companies are established in the EU (or in the EEA Member States), the application of the UTPR by EU Member States in the case of third countries LTCEs controlled by third countries UPEs does not infringe EU Fundamental Freedoms. Indeed, under the Court’s case law, the free movement of capital (which is the only freedom applicable erga omnes) does not apply in parallel with the freedom of establishment where the relevant tax rules concern tax rules involving only intercompany situations, but is altogether set aside by the latter (CJEU, 13 November 2012, Case C-35/11, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, paras 90 et seq. See, amplius on this point, Arginelli P., In tema di applicabilità della libera circolazione dei capitali a dividendi provenienti da Stati terzi e relativi a partecipazioni di controllo e di collegamento, in Rivista di diritto tributario, 2013, 5, IV, 114 et seq.).
4. The situation is more complex with regard to the possible conflict between the UTPR and tax treaties. The following notes shall discuss that question both in general terms and in respect of the application of the GloBE Rules by EU Member States.
To begin with, the UTPR may conflict with tax treaty rules only if one is to conclude that the GloBE Top-up Tax qualifies as a tax on income under Article 2 of OECD Model-based treaties (the assumption here is made that the relevant tax treaties comply with the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (2017), unless the contrary is specifically stated). In this respect, it is worth recalling that the GloBE Top-up Tax is computed by applying a differential tax rate (the Top-up Tax Percentage) to a tax base that represents a part of the net income (the Excess Profit) of the relevant LTCEs. That tax is collected by way of the UTPR in the hands of other Constituent Entities of the MNE Group. Thus, through the UTPR a GloBE Jurisdiction collects a tax on income, as defined by Article 2(2) of the OECD Model, which refers to both ‘taxes imposed on total income’ and taxes imposed ‘on elements of income’. Therefore, we concur with other scholars that regard the Top-up Tax collected through the UTPR as a tax levied on the income of LTCEs, which plainly falls within the scope of application of OECD Model-based tax treaties (inter alia, Chand V. et al., Tax Treaty Obstacles in Implementing the Pillar Two Global Minimum Tax Rules and a Possible Solution for Eliminating the Various Challenges, in World Tax Journal, 2022, 3 et seq.; De Broe L., Some EU and Tax Treaty Law Considerations on the Draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals in the Union, cit., 874 et seq. Contra, Avi-Yonah R. S., The UTPR and the Treaties, in Tax Notes Int’l, 2023 [posted on 2 January 2023]; Christians A. – Shay S.E., The Consistency of Pillar 2 UTPR With U.S. Bilateral Tax Treaties, in Tax Notes Int’l, 2023 [posted on 23 January 2023]).
Based on this premise, it is difficult not to see how the UTPR encroaches Articles 7(1) and 10(5) of the OECD Model, which allow the taxation of the profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State only by that State and the State where a permanent establishment of that enterprise is located, unless a specific item of income of that enterprise falls within the scope of application of another distributive rule (e.g., Article 11, in the case of interest sourced in a different State) or is distributed as dividends to a resident of another State (see, similarly, to a similar extent, De Broe L., Some EU and Tax Treaty Law Considerations on the Draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals in the Union, cit., 874 et seq.). Top-up Tax levied by means of the UTPR is an income tax – for tax treaty purposes – collected by a Jurisdiction on the profits of one (or more) LTCE(s) of another Jurisdiction regardless of any relevant connection existing between those profits and the territory of the taxing Jurisdiction (concurrent, Brauner Y., The Rule of Law and Rule of Reason in the Aftermath of BEPS, in Intertax, vol. 51, 2023, 268 et seq., who also discusses the reasons why the UTPR taxation should be regarded as illegal extraterritorial taxation under customary public international law). The LTCE is generally not a tax resident of, nor has a permanent establishment in, the taxing Jurisdiction, and its profits are taxed in the latter Jurisdiction through the application of the UTPR even where they are not otherwise sourced therein (as it is generally the case).
This author’s view is, therefore, that UTPR taxation should be regarded as encroaching tax treaty obligations under a good faith interpretation and application of the relevant treaty provisions, which is compelled by customary public international law as codified by Articles 26 and 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The only possible exception would be the case in which the tax treaty included a rule similar to Article 1(3) of the 2017 OECD Model, according to which ‘[t]his Convention shall not affect the taxation, by a Contracting State, of its residents except with respect to the benefits granted under paragraph 3 of Article 7, paragraph 2 of Article 9 and Articles 19, 20, 23 [A] [B], 24, 25 and 28’. Indeed, as (i) Article 1(3) preserves the taxing rights of a Contracting State – also the right to apply a UTPR taxation – vis-à-vis its resident entities, except with respect to a limited number of specifically expressed treaty provisions, and (ii) the above-mentioned Articles 7(1) and 10(5) are not within such express exceptions, one would have a good argument to conclude that the collection of the UTPR by a Contracting State from its own resident entities with respect of the profits of a LTCE of the other Contracting State should be deemed legitimate under Article 1(3) of the relevant treaty (see, in this respect, OECD (2020), Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation: Report on Pillar One Blueprint: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, paras. 679 and 689; De Broe L., Some EU and Tax Treaty Law Considerations on the Draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals in the Union, cit., 874 et seq.). However, this exception would not apply where the Contracting State collected the UTPR from local permanent establishments of non-resident entities, since in that case the UTPR would not be borne by a resident of the relevant Contracting State as required by Article 1(3) OECD Model.
5. This scenario partially changes where the issue of compatibility with tax treaty obligations is analysed taking into account EU primary law. Indeed, since the UTPR is encompassed within EU secondary law (the Directive), its disapplication by any EU Member State based on the argument that it violates that State’s international obligations under its relevant tax treaties could, in turn, determine a breach of EU secondary law by that very same Member State. The issue, therefore, becomes one of possible conflict between tax treaty obligations (Articles 7(1) and 10(5) of the relevant tax treaty) and EU law obligations (the obligation to collect the Top-up Tax through the UTPR imposed on the Member States by the Directive). In this respect, the matter is different depending on whether the tax treaty obligations of an EU Member State are towards other Member States, rather than towards third countries.
In the former case, the settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (e.g., CJEU, 27 February 1962, Case 10/61, Commission v. Italy; CJEU, 14 February 1984, Case 278/82, Rewe, para. 29) clearly affirms that treaties between EU Member States are, in any event, subject to primary and secondary EU law, regardless of whether those treaties predate or are subsequent to the accession of the relevant Member State to the European Union and to the adoption of the pertinent act of EU secondary legislation (e.g. the Directive). To put it differently, (tax) treaty rules effective among EU Member States must not be applied by such States where they would otherwise trigger legal effects incompatible with primary or secondary EU law (including the Directive). Thus, with respect to purely intra-EU situation, existing tax treaties between Member States cannot prevent the application of the UTPR provided for in the Directive.
With regard to the tax treaties concluded between Member States and third countries, the issue appears particularly relevant in respect of treaties concluded before the adoption of the Directive. Indeed, one may wonder whether EU law allows or compels Member States to continue applying the provisions of such (previous) treaties conflicting with the UTPR set out in the Directive, as long as they are not amended in order to eliminate that antinomy.
The interaction between EU law and previous treaties concluded between Member States and third countries is dealt with in Article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU (on Article 351 TFEU, see, inter alia, Helminen M., EU Tax Law: Direct Taxation, IBFD Publications, 2011, 29-30;Terra B.J.M. – Wattel P.J., European Tax Law, 160-165 (Kluwer Law International 2012); van Brederode R.F. -, O’Shea T., Legal Interpretation of Tax Law: The European Union, in van Brederode R.F. – Krever R. (eds.), Legal Interpretation of Tax Law, Kluwer Law International, 2014, 152-153; von Papp K., Solving Conflicts with International Investment Treaty Law from an EU Law Perspective: Article 351 TFEU Revisited, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, vol. 42(4), 2015, 325 et seq.; CJEU, 14 October 1980, Case C-812/79, Attorney General v. Burgoa,paras 6-10; CJEU, 4 July 2000, Case C-62/98, Commission v. Portugal, paras 43-44; PT: CJEU, 4 July 2000, Case C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal, paras 51-52; and CJEU, 3 March 2009, Case C-249/06, Commission v. Sweden,para. 35). That provision, however, has a very limited scope – at least literally – as it only concerns the conflicts between the TFEU and the Treaty on European Union, on the one hand, and the treaties concluded between third countries and Member States before the date of their accession to the European Union (or before 1 January 1958 for funding Member States), on the other hand. When such conflicts exist, Article 351(1) TFEU provides that the rights and obligations arising from the latter treaties ‘shall not be affected by the provisions of the [TEU and the TFEU]’. This grandfathering clause is balanced by the obligation imposed on Member States by Article 351(2) TFEU to «take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities», to «assist each other to this end and […], where appropriate, adopt a common attitude».
Article 351 TFEU, however, does not explicitly deal with the conflicts that may arise between the provisions of treaties concluded between Member States and third countries and the provisions of subsequent EU secondary legislation. Such conflicts may concern both treaties concluded before the accession to the European Union of the relevant Member States (or before 1 January 1958) and treaties concluded after their accession (or as from 1 January 1958).
With regards to treaties concluded before the accession, it follows naturally from the above that those conflicts should be regarded as covered by (a rule analogous to that stemming from) Article 351 TFEU. Indeed, since Article 351(1) explicitly allows Member States to continue applying previous treaties conflicting with the TEU or the TFEU, subject to the obligation to amend or eliminate their incompatible provisions, a fortiori it should be construed as allowing Member States to continue applying such treaties when they conflict with secondary EU law (CJEU, 2 August 1993, Case C-158/91, Jean-Claude Levy, para. 22). Similarly, the provision of Article 351(2), which represents a specific application of the general principle of sincere cooperation set forth in Article 4(3) TEU, must be regarded as imposing on Member States the duty to «take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities» between such treaties concluded with third countries and the relevant secondary EU legislation.
The question is more controversial in respect of treaties concluded by Member States after their date of accession (or after 1 January 1958) but before the adoption of the relevant secondary EU legislation. A few points appear clear in this respect. First, obligations arising under the treaties concluded with third countries remain effective under international law, notwithstanding the fact that they might be contrary to EU law. Article 27 VCLT, which in this respect codifies customary international law (Doerr O., Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties: A Commentary, Springer, 2012, m. nos 4-6, 453-455; Villiger M.E., Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, m. nos 1-3, 11, 370-375), makes it clear that, unless the exception provided for in Article 46(1) VCLT applies, a party «may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty». The same principle applies with regard to the possibility of invoking EU law to justify the failure to perform a treaty concluded with a State that is not a member of the European Union (see, to a similar extent, Klabbers J., Treaty Conflict and the European Union, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 197; Hilf M. – Schorkopf F., WTO und EG: Rechtskonflikte vor den EuGH?, 35 EuropaRecht, 2000, 74 et seq.; Krük H., Völkerrechtliche Verträge im Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Springer, 1977, 120). Second, when conflicts exist between EU secondary law and treaties concluded with third countries, Member States must ‘take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities’ between the two. Those appropriate steps include interpretation of the treaty in line with EU law (where possible), renegotiation or adjustment of the treaty and, as a last resort, denunciation of the treaties (e.g. CJEU, 18 November 2003, Case C-216/01, Budvar, para. 170; CJEU, 14 September 1999, Case C-170/98, Commission v. Belgium, paras 42-43). This is not so much because of Article 351(2) of the TFEU, which is not directly applicable to the case at hand, but because of the general principle of sincere cooperation, of which Article 351(2) is just a specific illustration (in the same vein, see Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria,para. 33; see also von Papp K., Solving Conflicts with International Investment Treaty Law from an EU Law Perspective: Article 351 TFEU Revisited, cit., 325 et seq.; J.P. Terhechte, Article 351 TFEU, the Principle of Loyalty and the Future Role of the Member States’ Bilateral Investments Treaties, European Yearbook for International Economic Law (2010), 9-10; D. Verwey, The European Community and the International Law of Treaties, TMC Asser Press, 2004, 48).
Conversely, uncertainty concerns the question of whether the fact that a treaty with a third country was concluded before the adoption of conflicting secondary EU legislation (e.g., the Directive) may justify the proposition that Member States’ rights and obligations arising from that treaty ‘shall not be affected by the provisions of’ the subsequent EU secondary legislation, similarly to what Article 351(1) TFEU explicitly prescribes in respect of treaties predating the EU accession (or, in any case, 1 January 1958). Indeed, there are arguments both in favour and against this view.
On the one hand, it might be claimed that Article 351(1) of the TFEU is a lex specialis that derogates from the general principle that EU law is binding on Member States notwithstanding any contrary domestic or international law provision. As such, it should be narrowly interpreted and not extended to situations that Article 351, based on its literal interpretation, does not cover (von Papp K., Solving Conflicts with International Investment Treaty Law from an EU Law Perspective: Article 351 TFEU Revisited, cit., 325 et seq.; L. De Broe, Some EU and Tax Treaty Law Considerations on the Draft EU Directive on Global Minimum Taxation for Multinationals in the Union, cit., 874 et seq.). In addition, the application, by analogy, of Article 351(1) to conflicts between treaties concluded with third countries and subsequent EU secondary law could endanger the effectiveness of EU law, both in areas of exclusive competence and in areas of shared competence. This would be particularly true with regard to cases in which the success of the EU secondary legislation is dependent on its swift and comprehensive application.
Moreover, EU competences resulting from the EU treaties could, in certain cases, pre-empt the power of Member States to include certain provisions in their treaties concluded with third countries, even in the absence of any actual use of such competences by the EU legislature, simply because the inclusion of those provisions in the treaties could hinder the effectiveness of future EU secondary legislation adopted on the basis of those competences. To put it differently, when EU primary law confers legislative power on the European Union in a specific field, that field should be regarded as pre-empted by the European Union, even in the absence of actual use of that power (Klabbers J., Treaty Conflict and the European Union, cit., 185). Based on this reading, it could be held that the conclusion of a treaty between a Member State and a third country after the conferral of such a power to the European Union (although before the approval of the relevant secondary EU legislation, i.e., the Directive) should be regarded, under Article 46 VCLT, as a manifest violation of the Member State’s competence to conclude treaties under a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. Such a violation would invalidate the consent of the Member State on the international plane and, therefore, would eradicate the conflict between the international obligations of that Member State under the treaty and its obligation under EU law.
On the other hand, however, one could argue that Article 351(1) TFEU is only a specific instance of the general principle according to which – since the European Union is built on and in compliance with international law – EU law cannot force its Member States to violate their international law obligations if such obligations, when they were created, were not contrary to any EU law norm (Klabbers J., Treaty Conflict and the European Union, cit., 197; Krük H., Völkerrechtliche Verträge im Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, cit., 120). Such principle would support the conclusion that secondary EU legislation adopted after the conclusion of a conflicting treaty between a Member State and a third country would not oblige, as a general rule, that Member State to breach its treaty obligations towards the third country unless those obligations could be regarded as contrary to earlier EU norms (either primary or secondary EU norms). Thus, Member States would be entitled, under EU law, to continue applying the provisions of the treaties they have concluded with third countries, notwithstanding the conflicts with posterior secondary EU legislation, subject to the duty to ‘take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities’ between the two.
With regard to the possibility that EU primary law, by conferring legislative power on the European Union in a specific field, pre-empts that field and thus inhibits the actions of Member States therein, it appears reasonable to conclude that this should be the case only when the conferral on the EU concerns an exclusive power. Indeed, it is only in such a case that Member States may be reasonably regarded as subservient to the European Union. On the contrary, when the power is shared between the European Union and the Member States in respect of a specific field, the exact power of the European Union can only be determined by its actions, in the absence of which that field should not be considered pre-empted and the Member States would maintain their competence to act (see also Klabbers J., Treaty Conflict and the European Union, cit., 186).
This is the case with regard to direct taxation, which falls only indirectly within the shared competence of the European Union through Article 4(2)(a) TFEU (the internal market shared competence). Moreover, as a matter of fact, the Council has seldom used its power to enact directives in the field of direct taxation under Article 115 TFEU, which generally concerns the approximation of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States that directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. In this respect, it could hardly be maintained that the conclusion of a tax treaty for the avoidance of double taxation between a Member State and a third country prior to the adoption of the Directive would have amounted, at the time of its conclusion, to a violation of EU law on the basis that the contracting States should have acknowledged the right for the EU legislature to adopt directives potentially overlapping with that treaty. The possibility for the EU to adopt such directives, which is also subject to the overarching principle of subsidiarity (Article 5(3) of the TEU), appears to be too remote and general to imply a limitation on Member States to include, in their tax treaties with third countries, provisions for the allocation of taxing rights.
In this respect, a hint of the possible existence of a general principle of EU law according to which the European Union cannot force its Member States to violate their international law obligations if such obligations, when they were created, were not contrary to the acquis communitaire, may be found in the various carve-outs that the European legislature has included in (proposals for) secondary EU tax law. For instance, Article 9(5) of the ATAD (Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, as amended by Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 of 29 May 2017, amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries) provides that the rule obliging Member States to tax the profits of foreign disregarded permanent establishments shall not apply when such Member States are required to exempt those profits under any tax treaty concluded with a third country. Similarly, the 2018 Commission Proposal for a Digital Permanent Establishment Directive (European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, COM(2018) 147 final [21 March 2018]) excludes – in Article 2 – from its personal scope of application «entities that are resident for corporate tax purposes in a third country with which the particular Member State in question has a convention for the avoidance of double taxation» unless that convention includes provisions similar to those included in the Proposal, i.e. provisions extending the permanent establishment concept to cover cases of significant digital presence and providing for a rule to attribute profits to such digital permanent establishments. The 2018 Commission Recommendation relating to the taxation of digital permanent establishments (European Commission, Commission Recommendation relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence, C(2018) 1650 final [21 March 2018], EU Law IBFD) likewise urges Member States «to negotiate the necessary adaptations to their double tax conventions with non-Union jurisdictions so as to bring into effect […] (a) a definition of a significant digital presence [and] (b) rules for attributing profits to or in respect of a significant digital presence». Also, the switch-over rule (from exemption to credit) provided for in Article 53(1) of the Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) Proposal (European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016) 685 final [25 October 2016]) for foreign dividends and capital gains does «not apply where a convention for the avoidance of double taxation between the Member State in which the taxpayer is resident for tax purposes and the third country where that entity is resident for tax purposes does not allow switching over from a tax exemption to taxing the designated categories of foreign income».
In this respect, even the Pillar Two Directive recognizes the possible conflict between its rules and tax treaties concluded by Member States and accordingly provides that, «[w]here, as a result of applying paragraphs 4 and 5 [of Article 4], a [dual resident] parent entity is located in a jurisdiction where it is not subject to a qualified IIR, it shall be deemed to be subject to the qualified IIR of the other jurisdiction, unless an applicable tax treaty prohibits the application of such rule» (Article 4(6) of the Pillar Two Directive). As both primary and secondary EU law overcome inter-Member States treaty provisions according to the settled case law of the Court of Justice, it seems reasonable to assume that the latter provision targets (prior) tax treaties concluded by Member States with third countries.
6. To sum up, the above analysis proves two things. First, under public international law Member States remain generally bound by the obligations stemming from the tax treaties that they concluded with third countries before the adoption of the Directive. From this vantage point, a good faith interpretation and application of Articles 7(1) and 10(5) of tax treaties concluded with third countries – before the adoption of the Directive – preclude Member States from applying the UTPR to the profits of LTCEs that are resident of those countries, unless the relevant tax treaty includes a provision analogous to Article 1(3) of the 2017 OECD Model and the UTPR is borne by entities that are tax resident of those Member States (rather than by permanent establishments of non-resident entities, which do not fall within the scope of application of Article 1(3) OECD Model).
Second, the possibility cannot be too lightly dismissed that a general principle of EU law exists that precludes the EU legislature from forcing Member States to violate their international (tax) obligations if such obligations, when they were created, were not contrary to the acquis communitaire (see, seemingly concurring, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 13 March 2008, Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer, paras 95-96; Mitroyanni I., European Union, in Lang M. et al. (eds.), GAARs: A Key Element of Tax Systems in the Post-BEPS World, IBFD Publications, 2016, 31-32). In this author’s opinion, this is the case in the situation at hand with respect to the application of the UTPR provided by the Pillar Two Directive.
(*) Il saggio è stato sottoposto a double blind peer review con valutazione positiva. Esso confluirà nel fascicolo n. 1/2025 (semestrale) della Rivista telematica di diritto tributario.
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Brauner Y.,The Rule of Law and Rule of Reason in the Aftermath of BEPS, in Intertax, vol. 51, 2023, 268 et seq.
van Brederode R.F. – O’Shea T.,Legal Interpretation of Tax Law: The European Union, in van Brederode R.F. – Krever R. (eds.), Legal Interpretation of Tax Law, Kluwer Law International, 2014, 152 et seq.
Chand V. et al., Tax Treaty Obstacles in Implementing the Pillar Two Global Minimum Tax Rules and a Possible Solution for Eliminating the Various Challenges, in World Tax Journal, 2022, 3 et seq.
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Informativa sul trattamento dei dati personali (ai sensi dell’art. 13 Regolamento UE 2016/679)
La vigente normativa in materia di trattamento dei dati personali definita in conformità alle previsioni contenute nel Regolamento UE 2016/679 del 27 aprile 2016 relativo alla protezione delle persone fisiche con riguardo al trattamento dei dati personali, nonché alla libera circolazione di tali dati (Regolamento generale sulla protezione dei dati, di seguito “Regolamento Privacy UE”) contiene disposizioni dirette a garantire che il trattamento dei dati personali si svolga nel rispetto dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali delle persone fisiche, con particolare riguardo al diritto alla protezione dei dati personali.
Finalità del Trattamento e base giuridica
Il trattamento dei dati personali è finalizzato a:
– fornire il servizio e/o prodotto richiesto dall’utente, per rispondere ad una richiesta dell’utente, e per assicurare e gestire la partecipazione a manifestazioni e/o promozioni a cui l’utente ha scelto di aderire (richiesta e acquisto abbonamento periodici; richiesta e acquisto libri; servizio di fatturazione; invio periodici in abbonamento postale, invio newsletter rivolte a studiosi e professionisti).
– inviare newsletter promozionale di pubblicazioni a chi ne ha fatto richiesta; ferma restando la possibilità per l’utente di opporsi all’invio di tali invii in qualsiasi momento.
– inviare all’utente informazioni promozionali riguardanti servizi e/o prodotti della Società di specifico interesse professionale ed a mandare inviti ad eventi della Società e/o di terzi; resta ferma la possibilità per l’utente di opporsi all’invio di tali comunicazioni in qualsiasi momento.
– gestire dati indispensabili per espletare l’attività della società: clienti, fornitori, dipendenti, autori. Pacini Editore srl tratta i dati personali dell’utente per adempiere a obblighi derivanti da legge, regolamenti e/o normativa comunitaria.
– gestire i siti web e le segreterie scientifiche per le pubblicazioni periodiche in ambito medico-giuridico rivolte a studiosi e professionisti;
Conservazione dei dati
Tutti i dati di cui al successivo punto 2 verranno conservati per il tempo necessario al fine di fornire servizi e comunque per il raggiungimento delle finalità per le quali i dati sono stati raccolti, e in ottemperanza a obblighi di legge. L’eventuale trattamento di dati sensibili da parte del Titolare si fonda sui presupposti di cui all’art. 9.2 lett. a) del GDPR.
Il consenso dell’utente potrà essere revocato in ogni momento senza pregiudicare la liceità dei trattamenti effettuati prima della revoca.
Tipologie di dati personali trattati
La Società può raccogliere i seguenti dati personali forniti volontariamente dall’utente:
nome e cognome dell’utente,
il suo indirizzo di domicilio o residenza,
il suo indirizzo email, il numero di telefono,
la sua data di nascita,
i dettagli dei servizi e/o prodotti acquistati.
La raccolta può avvenire quando l’utente acquista un nostro prodotto o servizio, quando l’utente contatta la Società per informazioni su servizi e/o prodotti, crea un account, partecipa ad un sondaggio/indagine. Qualora l’utente fornisse dati personali di terzi, l’utente dovrà fare quanto necessario perchè la comunicazione dei dati a Pacini Editore srl e il successivo trattamento per le finalità specificate nella presente Privacy Policy avvengano nel rispetto della normativa applicabile, (l’utente prima di dare i dati personali deve informare i terzi e deve ottenere il consenso al trattamento).
La Società può utilizzare i dati di navigazione, ovvero i dati raccolti automaticamente tramite i Siti della Società. Pacini editore srl può registrare l’indirizzo IP (indirizzo che identifica il dispositivo dell’utente su internet), che viene automaticamente riconosciuto dal nostro server, pe tali dati di navigazione sono utilizzati al solo fine di ottenere informazioni statistiche anonime sull’utilizzo del Sito .
La società utilizza i dati resi pubblici (ad esempio albi professionali) solo ed esclusivamente per informare e promuovere attività e prodotti/servizi strettamente inerenti ed attinenti alla professione degli utenti, garantendo sempre una forte affinità tra il messaggio e l’interesse dell’utente.
Trattamento dei dati
A fini di trasparenza e nel rispetto dei principi enucleati dall’art. 12 del GDPR, si ricorda che per “trattamento di dati personali” si intende qualsiasi operazione o insieme di operazioni, compiute con o senza l’ausilio di processi automatizzati e applicate a dati personali o insiemi di dati personali, come la raccolta, la registrazione, l’organizzazione, la strutturazione, la conservazione, l’adattamento o la modifica, l’estrazione, la consultazione, l’uso, la comunicazione mediante trasmissione, diffusione o qualsiasi altra forma di messa a disposizione, il raffronto o l’interconnessione, la limitazione, la cancellazione o la distruzione. Il trattamento dei dati personali potrà effettuarsi con o senza l’ausilio di mezzi elettronici o comunque automatizzati e comprenderà, nel rispetto dei limiti e delle condizioni posti dal GDPR, anche la comunicazione nei confronti dei soggetti di cui al successivo punto 7.
Modalità del trattamento dei dati: I dati personali oggetto di trattamento sono:
trattati in modo lecito e secondo correttezza da soggetti autorizzati all’assolvimento di tali compiti, soggetti identificati e resi edotti dei vincoli imposti dal GDPR;
raccolti e registrati per scopi determinati, espliciti e legittimi, e utilizzati in altre operazioni del trattamento in termini compatibili con tali scopi;
esatti e, se necessario, aggiornati;
pertinenti, completi e non eccedenti rispetto alle finalità per le quali sono stati raccolti o successivamente trattati;
conservati in una forma che consenta l’identificazione dell’interessato per un periodo di tempo non superiore a quello necessario agli scopi per i quali essi sono stati raccolti o successivamente trattati;
trattati con il supporto di mezzi cartacei, informatici o telematici e con l’impiego di misure di sicurezza atte a garantire la riservatezza del soggetto interessato cui i dati si riferiscono e ad evitare l’indebito accesso a soggetti terzi o a personale non autorizzato.
Natura del conferimento
Il conferimento di alcuni dati personali è necessario. In caso di mancato conferimento dei dati personali richiesti o in caso di opposizione al trattamento dei dati personali conferiti, potrebbe non essere possibile dar corso alla richiesta e/o alla gestione del servizio richiesto e/o alla la gestione del relativo contratto.
Comunicazione dei dati
I dati personali raccolti sono trattati dal personale incaricato che abbia necessità di averne conoscenza nell’espletamento delle proprie attività. I dati non verranno diffusi.
Diritti dell’interessato.
Ai sensi degli articoli 15-20 del GDPR l’utente potrà esercitare specifici diritti, tra cui quello di ottenere l’accesso ai dati personali in forma intelligibile, la rettifica, l’aggiornamento o la cancellazione degli stessi. L’utente avrà inoltre diritto ad ottenere dalla Società la limitazione del trattamento, potrà inoltre opporsi per motivi legittimi al trattamento dei dati. Nel caso in cui ritenga che i trattamenti che Lo riguardano violino le norme del GDPR, ha diritto a proporre reclamo all’Autorità Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali ai sensi dell’art. 77 del GDPR.
Titolare e Responsabile per la protezione dei dati personali (DPO)
Titolare del trattamento dei dati, ai sensi dell’art. 4.1.7 del GDPR è Pacini Editore Srl., con sede legale in 56121 Pisa, Via A Gherardesca n. 1.
Per esercitare i diritti ai sensi del GDPR di cui al punto 6 della presente informativa l’utente potrà contattare il Titolare e potrà effettuare ogni richiesta di informazione in merito all’individuazione dei Responsabili del trattamento, Incaricati del trattamento agenti per conto del Titolare al seguente indirizzo di posta elettronica: privacy@pacinieditore.it. L’elenco completo dei Responsabili e le categorie di incaricati del trattamento sono disponibili su richiesta.
Ai sensi dell’art. 13 Decreto Legislativo 196/03 (di seguito D.Lgs.), si informano gli utenti del nostro sito in materia di trattamento dei dati personali.
Quanto sotto non è valido per altri siti web eventualmente consultabili attraverso i link presenti sul nostro sito.
Il Titolare del trattamento
Il Titolare del trattamento dei dati personali, relativi a persone identificate o identificabili trattati a seguito della consultazione del nostro sito, è Pacini Editore Srl, che ha sede legale in via Gherardesca 1, 56121 Pisa.
Luogo e finalità di trattamento dei dati
I trattamenti connessi ai servizi web di questo sito hanno luogo prevalentemente presso la predetta sede della Società e sono curati solo da dipendenti e collaboratori di Pacini Editore Srl nominati incaricati del trattamento al fine di espletare i servizi richiesti (fornitura di volumi, riviste, abbonamenti, ebook, ecc.).
I dati personali forniti dagli utenti che inoltrano richieste di servizi sono utilizzati al solo fine di eseguire il servizio o la prestazione richiesta.
L’inserimento dei dati personali dell’utente all’interno di eventuali maling list, al fine di invio di messaggi promozionali occasionali o periodici, avviene soltanto dietro esplicita accettazione e autorizzazione dell’utente stesso.
Comunicazione dei dati
I dati forniti dagli utenti non saranno comunicati a soggetti terzi salvo che la comunicazione sia imposta da obblighi di legge o sia strettamente necessario per l’adempimento delle richieste e di eventuali obblighi contrattuali.
Gli incaricati del trattamento che si occupano della gestione delle richieste, potranno venire a conoscenza dei suoi dati personali esclusivamente per le finalità sopra menzionate.
Nessun dato raccolto sul sito è oggetto di diffusione.
Tipi di dati trattati
Dati forniti volontariamente dagli utenti
L’invio facoltativo, esplicito e volontario di posta elettronica agli indirizzi indicati su questo sito comporta la successiva acquisizione dell’indirizzo del mittente, necessario per rispondere alle richieste, nonché degli eventuali altri dati personali inseriti nella missiva.
Facoltatività del conferimento dei dati
Salvo quanto specificato per i dati di navigazione, l’utente è libero di fornire i dati personali per richiedere i servizi offerti dalla società. Il loro mancato conferimento può comportare l’impossibilità di ottenere il servizio richiesto.
Modalità di trattamento dei dati
I dati personali sono trattati con strumenti manuali e automatizzati, per il tempo necessario a conseguire lo scopo per il quale sono stati raccolti e, comunque per il periodo imposto da eventuali obblighi contrattuali o di legge.
I dati personali oggetto di trattamento saranno custoditi in modo da ridurre al minimo, mediante l’adozione di idonee e preventive misure di sicurezza, i rischi di distruzione o perdita, anche accidentale, dei dati stessi, di accesso non autorizzato o di trattamento non consentito o non conforme alle finalità della raccolta.
Diritti degli interessati
Ai soggetti cui si riferiscono i dati spettano i diritti previsti dall’art. 7 del D.Lgs. 196/2003 che riportiamo di seguito:
1. L’interessato ha diritto di ottenere la conferma dell’esistenza o meno di dati personali che lo riguardano, anche se non ancora registrati, e la loro comunicazione in forma intelligibile.
2. L’interessato ha diritto di ottenere informazioni:
a) sull’origine dei dati personali;
b) sulle finalità e modalità del trattamento;
c) sulla logica applicata in caso di trattamento effettuato con l’ausilio di strumenti elettronici;
d) sugli estremi identificativi del titolare, dei responsabili e del rappresentante designato ai sensi dell’articolo 5, comma 2;
e) sui soggetti o delle categorie di soggetti ai quali i dati personali possono essere comunicati o che possono venirne a conoscenza in qualità di rappresentante designato nel territorio dello Stato, di responsabili o incaricati.
3. L’interessato ha diritto di ottenere:
a) l’aggiornamento, la rettificazione ovvero, quando vi ha interesse, l’integrazione dei dati;
b) la cancellazione, la trasformazione in forma anonima o il blocco dei dati trattati in violazione di legge, compresi quelli di cui non è necessaria la conservazione in relazione agli scopi per i quali i dati sono stati raccolti o successivamente trattati;
c) l’attestazione che le operazioni di cui alle lettere a) e b) sono state portate a conoscenza, anche per quanto riguarda il loro contenuto, di coloro ai quali i dati sono stati comunicati o diffusi, eccettuato il caso in cui tale adempimento si rivela impossibile o comporta un impiego di mezzi manifestamente sproporzionato rispetto al diritto tutelato.
4. L’interessato ha diritto di opporsi, in tutto o in parte:
a) per motivi legittimi al trattamento dei dati personali che lo riguardano, ancorché pertinenti allo scopo della raccolta;
b) al trattamento di dati personali che lo riguardano a fini di invio di materiale pubblicitario o di vendita diretta o per il compimento di ricerche di mercato o di comunicazione commerciale.
Dati degli abbonati
I dati relativi agli abbonati sono trattati nel rispetto delle disposizioni contenute nel D.Lgs. del 30 giugno 2003 n. 196 e adeguamenti al Regolamento UE GDPR 2016 (General Data Protection Regulation) a mezzo di elaboratori elettronici ad opera di soggetti appositamente incaricati. I dati sono utilizzati dall’editore per la spedizione della presente pubblicazione. Ai sensi dell’articolo 7 del D.Lgs. 196/2003, in qualsiasi momento è possibile consultare, modificare o cancellare i dati o opporsi al loro utilizzo scrivendo al Titolare del Trattamento: Pacini Editore Srl – Via A. Gherardesca 1 – 56121 Pisa. Per ulteriori approfondimenti fare riferimento al sito web http://www.pacinieditore.it/privacy/
Subscriber data
Subscriber data are treated according to Italian law in DLgs, 30 June 2003, n. 196 as updated with the UE General Data Protection Regulation 2016 – by means of computers operated by specifically responsible personnel. These data are used by the Publisher to mail this publication. In accordance with Art. 7 of the above mentioned DLgs, 30 June 2003, n. 196, subscribers can, at any time, view, change or delete their personal data or withdraw their use by writing to Pacini Editore S.r.L. – Via A. Gherardesca 1, 56121 Ospedaletto (Pisa), Italy. For further information refer to the website: http://www.pacinieditore.it/privacy/
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TIPI DI COOKIE
Cookie di navigazione
Questi cookie permettono al sito di funzionare correttamente sono usati per raccogliere informazioni su come i visitatori usano il sito. Questa informazione viene usata per compilare report e aiutarci a migliorare il sito. I cookie raccolgono informazioni in maniera anonima, incluso il numero di visitatori del sito, da dove i visitatori sono arrivati e le pagine che hanno visitato.
Cookie Analitici
Questi cookie sono utilizzati ad esempio da Google Analytics per elaborare analisi statistiche sulle modalità di navigazione degli utenti sul sito attraverso i computer o le applicazioni mobile, sul numero di pagine visitate o il numero di click effettuati su una pagina durante la navigazione di un sito.
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Per avere maggiori informazioni
l titolare del trattamento è Pacini Editore Srl con sede in via della Gherardesca n 1 – Pisa.
Potete scrivere al responsabile del trattamento Responsabile Privacy, al seguente indirizzo email rlenzini@pacinieditore.it per avere maggiori informazioni e per esercitare i seguenti diritti stabiliti dall’art. 7, D. lgs 196/2003: (i) diritto di ottenere la conferma dell’esistenza o meno di dati personali riguardanti l’interessato e la loro comunicazione, l’aggiornamento, la rettificazione e l’integrazione dei dati, la cancellazione, la trasformazione in forma anonima o il blocco dei dati trattati in violazione di legge; (ii) diritto di ottenere gli estremi identificativi del titolare nonché l’elenco aggiornato dei responsabili e di tutti i soggetti cui i suoi dati sono comunicati; (iii) diritto di opporsi, in tutto o in parte, per motivi legittimi, al trattamento dei dati relativi all’interessato, a fini di invio di materiale pubblicitario o di vendita diretta o per il compimento di ricerche di mercato o di comunicazioni commerciali.
Per modificare le impostazioni, segui il procedimento indicato dai vari browser che trovi alle voci “Opzioni” o “Preferenze”.
Per saperne di più riguardo ai cookie leggi la normativa.
